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Butler and Post-Analytic Philosophy  
  
This paper has two aims: (i) to bring Judith Butler and Wilfrid Sellars into conversation; and (ii) to 
argue that Butler’s post-structuralist critique of feminist identity politics has metaphilosophical 
potential, given her pragmatic parallel with Sellars’s critique of conceptual analyses of knowledge. 
With regard to (i), I argue that Butler’s objections to the definitional practice constitutive of certain 
ways of construing feminism is comparable to Sellars’s critique of the analytical project geared towards 
providing definitions of knowledge. Specifically, I propose that moving away from a definition of 
‘woman’ to, what one may call, post-structuralist ‘sites of woman’ parallels moving away from a 
definition of knowledge to a pragmatic account of ‘knowledge’ as a recognizable standing in the 
normative space of reasons. With regard to (ii), I argue that the important parallels between Butler’s 
post-structuralist feminism and Sellars’s anti-representationalist normative pragmatism about 
knowledge enable one to think of her post-structuralist feminism as mapping out pragmatic cognitive 
strategies and visions for doing philosophy. This paper starts a conversation between two philosophers 
whom the literature has yet to fully introduce to each other.  
 
I  
If one is to see the transformative metaphilosophical potential of Judith Butler’s position about 
gender categories in terms of prioritizing post-structuralist feminist resources over purely 
analytical ones, one first needs to have Wilfrid Sellars’s reflections on conceptual analysis of 
knowledge in view. In Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Sellars aimed to radically 
revise the project of normative epistemology. Central to his Kantian commitment to the 
conceptual irreducibility of normativity and intentionality is Sellars’s rejection of an analysis 
of knowledge: 
 
... the idea that epistemic facts can be analyzed without remainder—even ‘in principle’—
into non-epistemic facts, whether phenomenal or behavioural, public or private, with no 
matter how lavish a sprinkling of subjunctives and hypotheticals is, I believe, a radical 
mistake—a mistake of a piece with the so-called ‘naturalistic fallacy’ in ethics (EPM: §5) 
… In characterising an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving an 
empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of 





Rather than conceive of knowledge in terms of justified true belief,1 or even in terms of that 
model’s Nozickean modifications,2 Sellars abandons any talk about knowledge that frames it 
as something to be analyzed.3 The concern about analysis here from the (left-wing4) Sellarsian 
perspective,5 which importantly differs to Timothy Williamson’s arguments for the category 
of knowledge as fundamental and therefore unanalyzable,6 is that conceptual analysis of 
knowledge fails to do justice to the normative, pragmatic dimensions of epistemic practice.7 
As Sellars writes:   
 
… one couldn’t have observational knowledge of any fact unless one knew many other 
things as well. And let me emphasize that the point is not taken care of by distinguishing 
between knowing how and knowing that, and admitting that observational knowledge 
requires a lot of ‘know how.’ For the point is specifically that observational knowledge 
of any particular fact, e.g. that this is green, presupposes that one knows general facts of 
the form ‘X is a reliable symptom of Y’. And to admit this requires an abandonment of 
the traditional empiricist idea that observational knowledge “stands on its own feet”. 
(EPM: §36) 
  
                                                 
1 S knows that p iff 
(1) p is true 
(2) S believes that p 
(3) S is justified in believing that p. 
2 S knows that p iff 
(1) p is true 
(2) S believes that p 
(3) S would believe that p if p was true 
(4) S would not believe that p if p was false. 
See Nozick (1983).  
3 Viz. “Modern analytical empiricism [...] differs from that of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume by its incorporation of 
mathematics and its development of a powerful logical technique. It is thus able, in regard to certain problems, to 
achieve definite answers, which have the quality of science rather than of philosophy. It has the advantage, in 
comparison with the philosophies of the system-builders, of being able to tackle its problems one at a time, instead 
of having to invent at one stroke a block theory of the whole universe. Its methods, in this respect, resemble those 
of science …” (Russell 1945: 834) 
4 Left-wing Sellarsians (most notably Richard Rorty, Robert Brandom, John McDowell, and Michael Williams) 
emphasise Sellars’s Kantian commitment to the conceptual irreducibility of intentionality and the manifest image. 
Right-wing Sellarsians (most notably Ruth Millikan, Paul Churchland, William Lycan, Jay Rosenberg, Daniel 
Dennett, and Johanna Seibt) emphasise Sellars’s commitment to a strong form of scientific realism pointing to the 
eliminability or reducibility of normativity.  
Crucially, the cost of putting Sellars into dialogue with Butler should not be fixing on one aspect of his views, the 
conceptual irreducibility of the logical space of reasons, at the expense of his strong scientific realism.  
5 Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind is clearly hostile to foundationalist approaches to knowledge, but such 
anti-foundationalism does not obviously entail a rejection of analyzing knowledge as such. One might even call 
Sellars’s anti-foundationalist conception of knowledge a ‘protracted re-analysis’ of knowledge. In response, I 
would contend that the Sellarsian objection to analyzing knowledge as such rests on the notion that since 
knowledge is not a natural kind, making sense of it requires a different framework from analysis, which is used 
to best make sense of natural kinds.  
6 See Williamson (2000).  




In perceptual experience, for Sellars, human beings do not just produce responses to causally 
affecting stimuli by means of verbal mechanisms, whether these are just atomic or complex 
propositions. Rather, in responding to stimuli in this linguistic way, human beings are 
articulating the representational content of perception in such a way as to enable reflection on 
it. Because we reflect on the content of our experience, we see ourselves, to use an expression 
from John McDowell, as ‘having the world in view’, and, as such, rationally constrained by 
and answerable to the world. For us to be in this phenomenological position, the content of our 
experience must be brought under concepts, because reflection is impossible without concepts. 
Sellars, in opposing the Myth of the Given,8 allies with Kant, who is one of the forbearers of 
inferentialism, because Kant’s claim that intuitions without concepts are blind underpins the 
idea that nothing can count as a legitimate component of experience (or phenomenological 
state) if it is not subject to concepts, whose function is to structure content in such a manner as 
to make contents inferentially relevant. In other words, perception is epistemically valuable if 
                                                 
8 The Myth of the Given can be explicated in the following manner: it refers to the traditional empiricist claim 
that perceptual judgments are epistemically justified by non-conceptual sense contents. At the base of our 
perceptual experience, there are things which do not have propositional content that immediately provide us with 
epistemic relations, particularly relations of justification. But, perceptual judgments, for Sellars, can only be 
justified to the extent that they have epistemic relations with cognitive states, things with propositional content. 
As Edrie Sobstyl puts it: “[t]he whole point of his challenge to the Myth of the Given is to undermine 
foundationalism in empiricism. The empiricist tradition … holds that you cannot have observational knowledge 
without other kinds of knowledge, on pain of succumbing to the Myth of the Given. And, Sellars goes on to argue, 
it is impossible to make sense of our agency in the world without giving up this myth”. (Sobstyl 2004: 133) 
See also the following helpful explications of what the Myth of the Given is from James O’Shea and Rebecca 
Kukla respectively:  
“Roughly speaking, one version of the idea of the Given that Sellars famously rejects, at least in one of its 
traditional epistemological roles, is the idea that since it would seem not all items of knowledge can be 
epistemically dependent on other items of knowledge, there must be some items of knowledge that are directly 
warranted for us simply in our immediate experience or apprehension of them, whether by sense or by reason, 
independently of any other knowledge that we might possess. Sellars, however, argued that there are no 
epistemically autonomous or independent items of directly given knowledge that could coherently fit that bill. 
And like Kant, the ways in which Sellars argued for this claim made it a point not just about knowledge, but about 
the more basic possibility of having any contentful and potentially self-aware experience of objects in a world at 
all—a point about intentionality or representational purport itself” (O’Shea 2016: 2). 
“Sellars argues that if perception is to be able to provide any warrant, its contents have to have conceptual structure 
sufficient to allow them to bear rational relationships to other conceptually articulated judgments. We must be 
able to perceive that x is F, rather than just taking in brute sense data. But, Sellars contends, our ability to perceive 
that some perceptual fact of the form ‘x is F’ holds requires that we grasp the conditions for the appropriate 
application of the concept F. That is, we must understand the conditions under which things that appear to be F 
are F, and vice versa. To use his example, I cannot see that a necktie is green unless I understand facts such as 
that green things look green under natural lighting, that they don’t look green when seen on a black and white 
television, and so forth (EPM: §18). Now, grasping such conditions for property recognition involves 
understanding under what conditions various inferences (such as the inference, in a certain context, to x’s actually 
being F) are or are not licensed by appearances. Without this normative and inferential mastery, we cannot 
distinguish between seeing that x is F and it merely looking as though x is F, in which case, according to Sellars, 
we could not drive the crucial wedge between appearance and reality that is necessary for our perceptual states to 
count as properly epistemic states. Hence for him, the ability to recognize a piece of evidence cannot be neatly 
separated from our ability to use it in inference, and hence perception cannot be taken as a capacity for discovery 




and only if it is inferentially relevant. Inferential relevance is determined by how perceptual 
contents are structured so that they can figure as elements of conceptually articulated 
judgments, as being involved in either premise or conclusion; to put this more clearly, concepts, 
as the logical functions of judgment, are used in the formation of judgments, and the form of 
judgment articulates experiential states. In articulating experiential states qua the form of 
judgment, experiential states become inferentially significant and relevant, because these states 
now figure in the space of reasons. Therefore, concepts play a crucial role in the inferential 
articulation of experiential states, given the relationship between concepts and judgment. 
Focusing on the production and reproduction of epistemic norms and knowledge-
attributions that undercuts the Myth of the Given necessarily involves articulating knowledge 
as a particular kind of language-game – where this epistemic practice is inherently normative, 
insofar as one is, to use Robert Brandom’s well-known left-wing Sellarsian expression, playing 
the game of giving and asking for reasons. To put this another way, the idea of framing 
questions about knowledge in this manner views such an epistemic kind as something one 
cannot intelligibly grasp independently of a deliberative public sphere. Since Sellars construes 
human beings as persons – i.e. intentional, linguistic, discursive, agentive beings – the 
normative space of reasons clearly contrasts with the descriptive space of nature.9 As Sellars 
puts it:   
 
To say that a certain person desired to do A, thought it his duty to do B but was forced to 
do C, is not to describe him as one might describe a scientific specimen. One does, indeed, 
describe him, but one does something more. And it is this something more which is the 
irreducible core framework of persons … Now, the fundamental principles of a 
community, which define what is ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’, ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, ‘done’ or 
‘not done’, are the most general common intentions of that community with respect to 
the behavior of the members of the group. It follows that to recognize a featherless biped 
or dolphin or Martian as a person requires that one think thoughts of the form ‘We (one) 
shall do (or abstain from doing) actions of kind A in circumstances of kind C’. To think 
thoughts of this kind is not to classify or explain, but to rehearse an intention. (SPR: 39-
40)  
 
In Hegelian fashion, Sellars insists that what individuates persons is not just a description of 
their practices, but also an account of how those practices convey persons’ sensitivity to a 
normative community; the ways in which persons are sensitive to fellow language-using 
agents. For Rebecca Kukla and Mark Lance, “Sellars is getting at the point that recognizing 
                                                 
9 Cf. “… The image marks a contrast between two kinds of intelligibility: the kind that is sought by (as we call it) 
natural science [“the kind we find in a phenomenon when we see it as governed by natural law”] and the kind we 
find in something when we place it in relation to other occupants of “the logical space of reasons” [“the kind of 




someone as a person is not merely an observative act, but also a practical act of the second kind 
… We become and remain the types of beings that have specific, agent-relative engagements 
with others through an ongoing network of hails and acknowledgments …”10 Equally, 
epistemic kinds are not discrete, purely representational kinds that can be broken down into 
primitives, to the extent that epistemic kinds are articulated asocially.11 Speech-acts involved 
in playing the game of giving and asking for reasons “are the acts they are in virtue of being 
planted within and constituted by a rich social and institutional context”.12 Any commitment 
to the social dimension of knowledge-attribution must involve a commitment to viewing the 
fixation of belief, to use Peirce’s term, as something that cannot be achieved independently of 
practices of inquiry.13 Since knowledge-attribution is a normative practice through-and-
through, it is necessarily social, as norms can only be meaningfully established through 
deliberative discourse in order to be deemed authoritative, legitimate, and valid for those 
engaging in such discourse.  
According to Sellars, because norms are “social achievements”,14 established by the 
intersubjective epistemic practices between agents, norms get their normative purchase – i.e. 
their rational bindingness – by virtue of being assented to and acknowledged by a community 
of discursive agents.15 To quote Steven Levine here, “[n]orms have no existence outside of 
their being taken as correct or incorrect – as being authoritative or not – by a community of 
persons”.16 Crucially, though, the practice of assenting to and acknowledging normative 
constraints and normative entitlements17 comprises determining the content of norms “through 
a ‘process of negotiation’ involving ourselves and those who attribute norms to us”.18 By virtue 
of being a process of negotiation, norms and identities are never fixed but always subject to 
“further assessment, challenge, defence, and correction”.19 As such, for Sellars, one replaces 
                                                 
10 Kukla and Lance 2009: 180-81.  
11 Cf. Lorraine Code’s feminist empiricism (1991).   
12 Kukla and Lance 2016: .  
13 To quote Sobstyl here, such an approach heralds “[a] shift away from Cartesian individualism toward more 
social models of knowledge” (Sobstyl 2004: 119).  
14 Brandom 2002: 216. 
15 As Herbert Feigl puts this point: “The quest for scientific knowledge is regulated by certain standards or criteria 
… the most important of these regulative ideals [is] intersubjective testability… What is here involved is … the 
requirement that the knowledge claims of science be in principle capable of test on the part of any person properly 
equipped with intelligence and the technical devices of observation and experimentation” (Feigl 1953: 11). 
Interestingly, though, one should note here that Feigl is rather more friendly to conceptual analysis than my 
construal of Sellars. 
16 Levine 2019: 253.  
17 See Haugeland (1997). 
18 Houlgate 2007: 139.  




the model of conceptual analysis with a normative pragmatic framework: knowing is a 
recognizable standing in the normative space of reasons.  
I think a crucial motivation for Sellars’s move here is not simply his Kantianism-
Hegelianism about normativity and meaning.20 His pragmatic abandonment of the framework 
of analysis about knowledge in 1956 also seems to spring from a prophetic concern with an 
apparently ossified noetic state of play: mainstream analytic epistemology’s apparent inability 
to get over Gettier-style problematics since 1963 led to discursive banality in talk about 
knowledge. For, one either had to find a counter-example to Gettier cases which safely secured 
the third necessary and sufficient condition for knowledge; or, one had to put forward a fourth 
necessary and sufficient condition for knowledge, having recognized the hopelessness of the 
tripartite model. Since Sellars aligned himself in complex ways with the pragmatist tradition, I 
think one has good reason to suppose his critique of the project of analysis about knowledge 
is, in part, a William James-inspired worry, insofar as normative epistemology was talking 
about normative matters in the wrong way. Overcoming the rigidity of conceptual analysis in 
this context would involve broadening one’s sense-making vocabulary.  
Thus far, I have reconstructed Sellars’s critique of the analytical project geared towards 
providing definitions of knowledge. In what follows, I argue that Butler’s critique of feminist 
identity should be understood as comparable to the Sellarsian critique of conceptual analysis 
here: definitional practices tend to over-simply and exclude other equally cogent and rich 
sense-making enterprises in favour of a non-pluralistic explanatory scheme. For, moving away 
from definitions of ‘woman’, to, what one may call, post-structuralist ‘sites of woman’ 
concerning performativity and social constitution, parallels moving away from a definition of 
knowledge to a pragmatic account of ‘knowledge’ as a recognizable standing in the normative 
space of reasons.21 The important similarities between Butler’s post-structuralist position on 
                                                 
As Kukla and Lance similarly express the point: “… we are not truly responsive to norms if we are merely subject 
to them and cannot author or resist them. Norms make claims on us only insofar as they are legitimate, and hence 
we must be capable, not only of violating them, but of challenging their legitimacy in order to count as able to 
recognize their binding force” (Kukla and Lance 2009: 185). 
20 There is a sizeable literature on this subject. See McDowell (1994, 2009), Brandom (1994, 2000, 2002, 2008, 
2015), Kukla and Lance (2009, 2016), O’Shea (2007, 2009, 2016), and deVries (2009, 2016) in particular.    
21 A potential critique of my argument concerning post-structuralist dimensions of gender could come from 
Cressida Heyes (2000), who argues that a Wittgensteinian form of feminism – one focused on family resemblances 
(cf. PI§§65-67) – may be better than a post-structuralist variety of feminism. Crucially, though, both Heyes and I 
reject any articulation of feminism that is foundationalist and questing for purity. As such, the structure of the 
dialectic here shifts from a suasive interplay between essentialist and anti-essentialist to a debate concerning 
explanatory arguments for anti-essentialism. The advantage of such a Dummettian shift consists in opening new 
frontiers of discussion. Addressing whether Heyes’s Wittgensteinian variety of feminism is the most convincing 
anti-essentialist feminism is the task of another paper, but I would venture to note at least I have initial concerns 




gender and Sellars’s normative pragmatism about knowledge enable one to think of her post-




For Butler, the emancipatory function of feminism should not be predicated on any attempt to 
define ‘woman’. As she writes:  
 
If a stable notion of gender no longer proves to be the foundational premise of feminist 
politics, perhaps a new sort of feminist politics is now desirable to contest the very 
reifications of gender and identity, one that will take the variable construction of identity 
as both a methodological and normative prerequisite, if not a political goal … The identity 
of the feminist subject ought not to be the foundation of feminist politics.22 
 
[T]he identity categories often presumed to be foundational to feminist politics, that is, 
deemed necessary in order to mobilize feminism as an identity politics, simultaneously 
work to limit and constrain in advance the very cultural possibilities that feminism is 
supposed to open up.23  
 
Under Butler’s account, feminist identity politics,24 since it is grounded on an analysis of 
woman, risks presupposing gender essentialism insofar as feminist identity politics is said to 
be organised around women as a unitary collective. Group membership is fixed by some 
“golden nugget of womanness”,25 a set of natural conditions, experiences, practices, or 
features that women qua women supposedly share and that are necessary and sufficient for 
their gender: e.g. a human being who (i) has an XX chromosome, female physical features and 
sex organs, (ii) female somatic phenomenology, and (iii) the social phenomenological features 
traditionally associated with the term ‘woman’. As K. Anthony Appiah notes on the logic of 
identity politics tout court, “[c]ollective identities, in short, provide what we might call scripts: 
narratives that people can use in shaping their life plans and in telling their life stories”.26 For 
Butler, the danger of defining ‘woman’ lies in how the definitional practice (a) oversimplifies; 
and (b) is itself ideological and risks deeming some women as inauthentic.  
Regarding (a), unitary gender notions narrow the conceptual field and fail to take 
differences amongst women into account, thus failing to recognize “the multiplicity of cultural, 
                                                 
22 Butler 1999: 9. 
23 Ibid., p. 187. 
24 For further on identity politics, see Alcoff (1997, 2000, 2006a, 2006b). 
25 Spelman 1988: 159. 




social, and political intersections in which the concrete array of “women” are constructed”.27 
Blindness to plurality is the result of a conceptual lacuna in which the vocabulary and 
discursive matrix for coordinating discourse about identity is overly restricted. As Susan 
Strickland phrases it: 
 
[D]ominant theories and categories were wrong not simply in universalising beyond their 
scope, i.e., that they were partial in the sense of being limited, not universally applicable, 
but that they were also partial in the sense of being ideological, interested and distorted; 
in short to a greater or lesser extent false … The assertion of feminist ‘difference’ was 
and is, basically a challenge and critique.28 
 
From this perspective, then, I would argue that whatever deficiencies there are in making sense 
of ‘women’ are instantiations of a more general and structural conceptual failure that is part 
and parcel of identity politics eo ipso. To quote Appiah here: 
 
But it seems to me that one reasonable ground for suspicion of much contemporary 
multicultural talk is that it presupposes conceptions of collective identity that are 
remarkably unsubtle in their understandings of the processes by which identities, both 
individual and collective, develop.29 
 
Though one could argue definitional practice is politically useful for mobilizing attention, a 
powerful left-wing worry about contemporary identity talk is that its propensity for construing 
groups as monolithic blocs risks articulating identities in Parmenidean ways. Using a tournure 
de phrase from Pringle-Pattison, an overly simple and unsubtle discursive framework about 
groups sees individuals “devoured, like clouds before the sun, in the white light of the unica 
substantia”.30 As if failing to make substantive room for differences within groups is not 
problematic enough, the Parmenidean articulation of identity would also render inquirers 
conceptually blind to the genealogical backdrop for developing an approach to identity as, what 
one might call, a ‘hermeneutic sphere’. For, conceptualising identity through a narrow prism 
that does not refer to historical, sociological, cultural, psychological, psychoanalytic, and 
anthropological backdrops, serving as the crucible in which identities are formed, reformed, 
moulded, developed, redeveloped, and contested would seem a rather impoverished way of 
making sense of things.31   
                                                 
27 Butler 1999: 19-20. 
For further on this subject, see Spelman (1988).  
28 Strickland 1994: 267. For further on this subject, see Spelman (1988). 
29 Appiah 1994: 156. 
30 MPC: 173. 




Regarding (b), in the attempt to undercut phallogocentric ways of conceptualizing the 
feminine subject, feminist identity politics created a new form of ideology.32 The definition of 
‘woman’ invariably reifies gender,33 which, as Linda Nicholson argues, “operates as a policing 
force which generates and legitimizes certain conditions, experiences, practices, experiences, 
etc., and curtails and delegitimizes others”.34 However, one should not lose sight of how the 
ideological-reificatory features of gender definitions spring from the ideological-reificatory 
features built into identity definitions eo ipso, since “[i]dentity categories are never merely 
descriptive, but always normative, and as such, exclusionary”.35 As William Connolly writes:  
 
An identity is established in relation to a series of differences that have become socially 
recognized. These differences are essential to its being. If they did not coexist as 
differences, it would not exist in its distinctness and solidity. Entrenched in this 
indispensable relation is a second set of tendencies, themselves in need of exploration, to 
congeal established identities into fixed forms, thought and lived as if their structure 
expressed the true order of things. When these pressures prevail, the maintenance of one 
identity (or field of identities) involves the conversion of some differences into otherness, 
into evil, or one of its numerous surrogates. Identity requires difference in order to be, 
and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty. Identity 
is thus a slippery, insecure experience …36   
 
The significant problem with feminist identity politics is that if one does not satisfy the 
definition of ‘woman’, the implication is that one is not truly a woman; one is not authentically 
a woman; one is not really a woman. And, extending this to the political sphere, if one is not 
truly a woman, if one is not authentically a woman, if one is not really a woman, then one is 
highly unlikely to receive feminist representation at any level of concerted resistance to 
androcentric environments. In other words, feminist identity politics involves symbolic 
violence with material effects, insofar as ‘woman’ can never be defined in a way that does not 
suggest – either implicitly or explicitly – some “unspoken normative requirements”37 to which 
women should conform, so as to be deemed real women. As Appiah writes, “[i]t is at this point 
that someone who takes autonomy seriously will ask whether we have not replaced one kind 
of tyranny with another”.38  
                                                 
32 Viz. “Do the exclusionary practices that ground feminist theory in a notion of “women” as subject paradoxically 
undercut feminist goals to extend its claims to “representation”?” (Butler 1999: 8)  
33 Viz. “Is the construction of the category of women as a coherent and stable subject an unwitting regulation and 
reification of gender relations? And is not such a reification precisely contrary to feminist aims?” (Butler 1999: 
8-9) 
34 Nicholson 1998: 293. 
35 Butler 1991: 160. 
36 Connolly 2002: 64. 
37 Butler 1999: 9. 




I agree with Appiah about how the dialectic shifts to intra-group struggles – however, 
there is room to substantiate the particular notion of tyranny here and explicate in more detail 
what exactly is so dangerous about this type of tyranny: mobilising discourse and praxis around 
unitary collective identity invariably means that membership of that collective turns on how 
pure one’s identity claims are judged.39 This, as Christopher Zurn rightly phrases it, “fosters 
illiberal pressures toward conformity against supposedly “inauthentic” members; it perpetuates 
subordinating intra-group hierarchies whereby only some have the privilege of defining and 
speaking for the group’s collective identity”.40 For example, consider the following table, 
which illustrates how a first-person question about inclusion in a relevant social group can 
often be met with a gatekeeping response concerning the ‘purity’ and ‘legitimacy’ of that 
individual’s claim for inclusion in that particular social group: 
     
Ain’t I Black/Latinx/Asian/White? Is X Black/Latinx/Asian/White Enough?41 
Ain’t I a Man? Is X Enough of a Man?42 
Ain’t I a Woman? Is X Enough of a Woman?43 
Ain’t I a Conservative? Is X Conservative Enough? 
Ain’t I a Radical? Is X Radical Enough? 
Ain’t I a Liberal? Is X Liberal Enough? 
Ain’t I Disabled? Is X Disabled Enough? 
Ain’t I Queer? Is X Queer Enough?44 
Ain’t I Poor? Is X Poor Enough? 
Ain’t I Young/Old? Is X Young/Old Enough? 
 
The following powerful quote makes all these worries about intra-group hierarchies clear: 
 
When the General Federation of Women’s Clubs was faced with the question of the 
color line at the turn of the [twentieth] century, Southern clubs threatened to secede. 
One of the first expressions of the adamant opposition to the admission of colored clubs 
was disclosed by the Chicago Tribune and the Examiner during the great festival of 
fraternization at the Atlanta Exposition, the Encampment of the GAR in Louisville, and 
the dedication of the Chickamauga battlefield … The Georgia Women’s Press Club felt 
so strongly on the subject that members were in favor of withdrawing from the 
                                                 
39 Viz. “You’re not black enough for them. You’re not R&B enough. You’re very pop. The white audience has 
taken you away from them” – Whitney Houston, after being booed at the 1989 Soul Train Awards.  
40 Zurn 2015: 88. 
See also Fraser (2000, 2001). 
41 Viz. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jun/09/too-white-too-black-or-not-black-enough-this-
is-not-a-question-for-others-to-decide 
Viz. http://theconversation.com/who-counts-as-black-71443.   
41 Logan 1997: 235. 
42 Viz. https://everydayfeminism.com/2017/03/trans-folk-dont-feel-trans-enough/; 
https://www.politicalresearch.org/2016/08/11/the-christian-rights-love-affair-with-anti-trans-feminists/ 
43 Viz. https://everydayfeminism.com/2017/03/trans-folk-dont-feel-trans-enough/; 
https://www.politicalresearch.org/2016/08/11/the-christian-rights-love-affair-with-anti-trans-feminists/ 




Federation if colored women were admitted there. Miss Corinne Stocker, a member of 
the Managing Board of the Georgia Women’s Press Club and one of the editors of the 
Atlanta Journal, stated on September 19: “In this matter the Southern women are not 
narrow-minded or bigoted, but they simply cannot recognize the colored women 
socially … At the same time we feel that the South is the colored woman’s best 
friend.”45  
 
Furthermore, bell hooks importantly reminds her readers that in this example of the Georgia 
Women’s Press Club:  
 
Here we have the spectacle of educated, refined, and Christian women who have been 
protesting and laboring for years against the unjust discrimination practised against 
them by men, now getting together and the first shot out of their reticules is fired at one 
of their own because she is black, no other reason or pretence of reason.46 
 
In their respective ways, both Rayford Logan and hooks portray systemic testimonial as well 
as hermeneutic injustice in these contexts, to the extent that these socio-epistemic pathologies 
are revealed as the workings of an epistemic hierarchy: white women claimed to understand 
black women better than black women understood themselves. According to the white 
feminists here, black women lacked the discursive architecture to produce knowledge; as such, 
the white feminists epistemically and politically managed the black women as they defined 
them. 
Tragically, the irony is that movements which are deemed progressive and hallmarks of 
the New Left contain fascistic features with the concern for purity and authenticity,47 to the 
extent that oppressive and marginalizing power relations are being ideologically reproduced 
rather than being systematically eroded. To quote Butler here:  
 
[T]he premature insistence on a stable subject of feminism, understood as a seamless 
category of women, inevitably generates multiple refusals to accept the category. These 
domains of exclusion reveal the coercive and regulatory consequences of that 
construction, even when the construction has been elaborated for emancipatory purposes. 
Indeed, the fragmentation within feminism and the paradoxical opposition to feminism 
from “women” whom feminism claims to represent suggest the necessary limits of 
identity politics.48    
 
                                                 
45 Logan 1997: 235.  
46 Letter to the Chicago Tribune sent by a white male – referenced by hooks 1982: 130.   
47 Particularly evocative examples of this can be seen in the conflict between Trans-exclusionary Radical Feminist 
(terf) activism and trans-activism. What is common to terf-activism, to quote Katherine O’Donnell in conversation 
with me, is “a yearning for a taxonomy that can provide for stability, hierarchy, and purity”.  




As such, the mistake of feminist identity politics was not that they gave a bad definition of 
‘woman’, but that feminist identity politics aimed to define ‘woman’.49 The definitional practice 
operates juridically, since “the subjects regulated by such structures are, by virtue of being 
subjected to them, formed, defined, and reproduced in accordance with the requirements of 
those structures”.50 In order to overcome the limitations of such a way of theorizing about 
gender and its corresponding story of political representation and participation, Butler argues 
one ought to adopt a performativity thesis. A performativity thesis necessarily involves 
understanding ‘woman’ as “a term in process, a becoming, a constructing that cannot rightfully 
be said to originate or to end. As an ongoing discursive practice, it is open to intervention and 
resignification”.51  
Genders and gendered traits (like being nurturing or ambitious) are the “intended or 
unintended product[s] of a social practice”.52 Females become women through a process 
whereby they acquire ‘womanly’ traits and learn ‘womanly’ conduct.53 Children are often 
dressed in gender-specific clothes and colors, and parents tend to buy their children gender-
specific toys and games. Parents also (regardless of intentions) tend to reaffirm certain 
‘appropriate’ gender-specific behaviors: girls qua ‘girls’ are often discouraged from playing 
sports like rugby; boys qua ‘boys’ are often told not to cry. For Butler, then, gender is not “a 
stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts follow; rather, gender is … instituted 
… through a stylised repetition of [habitual] acts”.54 These acts include wearing certain 
clothing that marks one’s gender, moving and positioning one’s body that marks one’s gender, 
etc. Understood in such a manner, performativity and its new vocabulary involves pragmatic 
constitution: gender is not something one is, it is something one does; it is a sequence of acts, 
a doing rather than a being. “Gender only comes into being through these gendering acts”.55 
Repetition and institutionalisation of these performative acts – speech, behavioral, etc. – 
                                                 
49 Cf. the following from Monique Wittig: “What is woman? Panic, general alarm for an active defense. Frankly, 
it is a problem that the lesbians do not have because of a change of perspective, and it would be incorrect to say 
that lesbians associate, make love, live with women, for “woman” has meaning only in heterosexual systems of 
thought and heterosexual economic systems. Lesbians are not women”. (Wittig 1992: 32) 
50 Butler 1999: 4.   
51 Ibid., p. 43.   
A very common critique of Butler’s post-structuralism, one which is most clearly evidenced by Martha 
Nussbaum’s extraordinarily vicious ‘The Professor of Parody’, centers on the claim that Butler’s position 
undermines feminist activism and politics, since post-structuralism depoliticizes the feminine standpoint, 
stultifying its emancipatory potential. However, on the contrary, I think there is every reason to see Butler’s post-
structuralism as furthering feminist activism and politics by articulating a genealogical and performative 
framework, a framework that is far more democratic and inclusive. For further on this point, see Stone (2004).   
52 Haslanger 1995: 97. 
53 Viz. TSS: 273. 
54 Butler 1999: 179. 




crystallizes gender, and, in doing so, invariably encourages people to think of gender as a 
natural kind. The critical perspective on gender provided by performative theory and its 
conceptual allies, therefore, aims at the progressive transformation of society from one 
structured in accordance with reified and oppressive gender norms.  
The epistemic advantages of performative theory are that, unlike definitional practices, 
performativity is better equipped to make sense of gender: it recognises how gender is a ‘messy’ 
concept and therefore requires a discursive matrix that can sensitively coordinate and capture 
the complex phenomenological and hermeneutic textures indicative of gendered bodies and 
gendered experiences.56 Both Natalie Stoljar and Mari Mikkola, to varying extents, write in a 
supportive manner on the subject of acknowledging just how complex and multidimensional 
gender is: 
 
womanness is something complex, not something simple, and the ingredients in the 
complex structure of womanness are not always the same ingredients from one woman 
to another. The same ingredients make up the components in our concept of woman but 
are not always all instantiated in the individuals to whom the concept applies.57 
 
Women may simply have an extremely complex and, thus, unanalysable feature of 
womanness in common that makes them women.58 
 
I would argue that applying definitional practices to such a domain of inquiry is a category 
error insofar as definitions are “too buttoned-up and white-chokered and clean-shaven a 
thing”59 to adequately make sense of not only messy and contested bodies and experiences, but 
also the norms and power dynamics governing gender-attribution. In this way, one 
increasingly moves away from definitions of ‘woman’ to, what one may call, post-structuralist 
sites of ‘woman’.60 From this perspective, then, the following pragmatist critique of early 
modern rationalism by James is particularly relevant to Butler’s post-structuralism here:      
 
A pragmatist turns his back resolutely and once for all upon a lot of inveterate habits dear 
to professional philosophers. He turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from 
verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and 
pretended absolutes and origins. He turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards 
facts, towards action and towards power. (Pragmatism: 27)      
                                                 
56 Cf. “The move toward performative alternatives to representationalism shifts the focus from questions of 
correspondence between descriptions and reality (e.g., do they mirror nature or culture?) to matters of practices/ 
doings/actions. I would argue that these approaches also bring to the forefront important questions of ontology, 
materiality, and agency …” (Barad 2003: 803). 
See also Haraway (1997).  
57 Stoljar 2011: 40. 
58 Mikkola 2006: 92.  
59 EIRE: 146.    





However, a crucial set of points must be made before directly returning to the proposed 
Sellars-Butler conversation, as the stakes are philosophically and politically high here. Analytic 
feminists, of course, are not blind to the complex phenomenological and hermeneutic textures 
indicative of gendered bodies and gendered experiences. Indeed, Katherine Ritchie (2015; 
forthcoming) has recently argued that talk about racial, gender, disabled, and sexual orientation 
groups needs greater nuance, helpfully distinguishing between Organised Social Groups and 
Feature Social Groups. For Ritchie, Organised Social Groups are groups like sports teams, 
committees, and clubs, typified by a formal structure. Feature Social Groups are racial groups, 
gender groups, disabled groups, and sexual orientation groups constituted by a shared feature. 
“Social groups of this sort are not simply collections of people, for they are more fundamentally 
intertwined with the identities of the people described as belonging to them. They are a specific 
kind of collectivity, with specific consequences for how people understand one another and 
themselves”.61 Ritchie, crucially, notes that ‘sharing a feature’ must not be interpreted in such 
a way that involves a commitment to essentialism about gender or race or disability or 
sexuality: “[o]ne might argue that the view that social kinds are property clusters rather than 
properties is preferable, as taking there to be a property womanness or Blackness is to 
essentialise.62 One might argue that not all women or all Black people have a shared (even 
socially constructed) feature; one should be anti-essentialist”.63  
 Ritchie stays neutral on the subject of whether the shared feature emblematic of racial 
groups, gender groups, disabled groups, and sexual orientation groups is a natural property or 
a socially constructed property or some combination of natural and socially constructed 
property.64 However, while this quasi-Lockean position on the metaphysics of Feature Social 
Groups could be construed dissatisfying, insofar as one is none-the-wiser about the positive 
nature of the shared feature, Ritchie’s position should not be dismissed. This is because her 
commitment to anti-essentialism in conjunction with her notion of a cluster concept at least 
seems to explicitly resist the urge to reduce gender, etc. in “an all or nothing way as a simple 
idea”.65 To quote Brian Epstein, “[the aim here is] to challenge the idea that they have simple 
                                                 
61 Young 1990: 43. 
62 See Stoljar (1995, 2011) for a sophisticated account of gender as a cluster concept.   
63 K. Ritchie forthcoming: 27n. 
64 Viz. “I am staying neutral on the nature of the features or properties. They might be natural, socially constructed, 
or partially natural and partially social in nature”. (Ritchie forthcoming: 2n)  




answers. There seems to be a powerful drive among theorists to unify and simplify the endless 
diversity and variation among kinds of groups”.66      
My concern about Ritchie’s position, though, is that she appears to deploy 
investigations into social ontology in a manner that creates insufficient scope for critical social 
ontology. For, Ritchie claims that her articulation of the metaphysics of social groups is in 
service of “better understand[ing] our world and ourselves”.67 However, following Marx, the 
task for philosophy is not merely to interpret the world, but to change it. Therefore, with regard 
to the project of social ontology, it is not sufficient to better carve the social at its joints; one 
must also have in view whether or not the metaphysical categories we use to make sense of 
gender, race, disabled,68 and sexual orientation groups are themselves prone to ideological 
distortion and vitiation. In other words, one must prepare to not only recognise that our 
vocabulary for talking about gender and the like is not fit for purpose, but also prepare to 
transform that very vocabulary for the emancipatory purpose of ending oppression, 
domination, and marginalisation. This is why, as Sally Haslanger writes, “[a]t the most general 
level, the task is to develop accounts of gender and race that will be effective in the fight against 
injustice”.69  
I think it is worth stating that there seems to be some degree of tension between 
Haslanger’s claim here with her own ameliorative definition of ‘woman’.70 The tension seems 
to lie in how it would appear that although Haslanger’s definition of woman clearly designates 
those under the oppressive forces of patriarchal misogyny and sexism, it seems to exclude those 
who identify as women who do not genuinely find themselves systematically subordinated in 
some dimension and who are not marked in marginalising ways.71 The problem is that if one 
does not satisfy the ameliorative definition of ‘woman’, the implication is that one is not truly 
a woman; one is not authentically a woman; one is not really a woman. ‘Woman’ can never be 
defined amelioratively in a way that does not suggest – either implicitly or explicitly – some 
unspoken normative requirements to which women should conform, so as to be deemed real 
                                                 
66 Epstein forthcoming: 2. 
67 K. Ritchie forthcoming: 17. 
68 See Barnes (2016).  
69 Haslanger 2012: 226. Cf. Jones 2014: 101. 
70 “S is a woman if S is systematically subordinated along some dimension (economic, political, legal, social, etc.) 
and S is “marked” as a target for this treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence 
of a female’s biological role in reproduction” (Haslanger 2000: 39).  
71 According to Mikkola, “Haslanger’s position is gender realist and she maintains that women have a feature in 
common that makes them women: they are all socially positioned as subordinate or oppressed where this social 
positioning is sex-marked” (Mikkola 2006: 87). See Stoljar (2011) for a response to Mikkola’s reading of 




women: the ameliorative definition of ‘woman’, regardless of its critical dispositionality, 
remains a definition, and therefore operates under juridical logic.72 As Kukla and Lance express 
a similar point: 
 
to be a member of the community is not, in the first instance, to have some feature in 
common with other community members. Rather, the ‘we’ is constituted and sustained 
through the transactions among the various mutually recognizing subjects who make it 
up. The community is not a predefined space into which candidates may fit or fail to fit; 
it is a space created and given its character and its boundaries by the discursively 
interacting individuals who make it up—individuals who can speak from a first-person 
perspective to others in a second-person voice.73 
 
III 
The question now concerns the ways in which Sellars’s critique of analysis and Butler’s 
critique of feminist identity politics bear on one another: both Butler and Sellars, in their 
respective ways, object to discursive matrixes that narrow the conceptual field. For example, 
as I have argued, Butler worries that unitary categories of gender and identity are cognitively 
and politically destabilising, since they are inherently exclusionary and reifying;74 Sellars 
worries that analyzing knowledge instead of construing such an epistemic kind pragmatically 
renders inquirers unable to make sense of playing the game of giving and asking for reasons.  
(i) Sellars’s critique of analysis is decidedly uninterested in finding any features or 
states or properties serving as conditions of knowledge. Rather, knowledge is conceptualised 
in terms of a recognizable standing in the logical space of reasons, the “network of discursive 
holdings”75 comprising the norm-constituting practices of language-using discursive agents. 
Crucially, the act of playing the game of giving and asking for reasons is relational. 
Importantly, those “relationally defined activities sustained by mutual recognition”76 are 
complex through-and-through, to the extent that the practices occurring in the logical space of 
                                                 
72 In response to what I have just argued, as helpfully raised by one of the reviewers of my paper, I recognise the 
risk that I fail to appreciate the externalist aspect of the ameliorative definition given by Haslanger. That is, women 
are in some sense defined by others as such when they are oppressed as women. Thus, my critique that some 
women do not think of themselves as oppressed may not apply to Haslanger’s definition of women. First, because 
whether or not one thinks and/or feels they are oppressed is often not a good test of oppression. Second, being 
oppressed might be considered a concept that applies counterfactually. For example, if x is treated as a subordinate 
(systematically penalised for being not a man) under conditions C, then one is a woman. There is an important 
place for the externalist approach in making sense of oppression. However, my critical remark should be viewed 
more modestly, insofar as I only want to draw attention to how there is also an important place for an internalist 
dimension. To clarify, I am only talking about the internalist approach here. 
73 Kukla and Lance 2009: 192. 
74 And that border control becomes the focus of our politics rather than an emancipatory vision.  
75 Kukla and Lance 2009: 192. 




reasons are articulated in processist terms. The processist inflections of the game of giving and 
asking for reasons reveal that certain normative functions can be performed only by relational, 
as opposed to substantival, categories. The idea that epistemic norms are formed, moulded, and 
developed implies that ordinary analytical vocabulary is subject to an error theory. Understood 
in such a manner, normative pragmatism about knowledge illustrates how conceptual analyses 
of knowledge rest on construing epistemic norms as substantival, rather than as relational; 
how conceptual analyses of knowledge mistakenly rest on reifying epistemic norms and kinds; 
how conceptual analyses of knowledge mistakenly rest on the ““Platonic scorecard” vision of 
normative space as an abstract network”.77  
The normative space of reasons’s clear contrast with the descriptive space of nature 
means that one cannot apply conceptual analysis, a strategy best conducive for making sense 
of natural kinds (e.g. water), to the social space of reasons. Knowing is to be baptised in a 
deliberative public sphere of fallible discursive transactions; knowing is to move sufficiently 
well in the normative space of reasons through sensitivity to reasons. For Sellars, since 
personhood and knowledge are “equiprimordial [normative] phenomena”,78 persons and 
knowledge are irreducible to the ideal scientific image, not because they are ‘emergent’ kinds 
over and above the descriptive-explanatory categories of science, but because personhood and 
knowledge are not in the business of describing and explaining in the first place.    
 (ii) Butler’s critique of definitional practice is decidedly uninterested in finding any 
features or states or properties serving as conditions of ‘woman’. Rather, gender is articulated 
as involving repetitive and stylised performative acts. Crucially, those performative acts 
constituted the norms governing gender attribution and the like are relational. Importantly, the 
relationally defined performative activities sustained by recognition are complex through-and-
through, to the extent that repetitive and performative stylised acts can be understood in 
processist terms. The processist inflections of gender performativity reveal that certain 
normative functions can be performed only by relational, as opposed to substantival, categories: 
to be gendered is not to satisfy a fixed set of biological or cultural criteria, but to be baptised 
in a system of power relations imbuing one’s body and experiences with social significance. 
The idea that gender is formed, moulded, and developed implies that ordinary vocabulary is 
subject to an error theory: gender performativity illustrates how definitional practice rests on 
construing gender as substantival, rather than as relational;79 how definitional practice 
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mistakenly rests on reifying gender. As Karen Barad phrases it, “[i]t is hard to deny that the 
power of language has been substantial. One might argue too substantial, or perhaps more to 
the point, too substantializing”.80    
I would contend that the ways in which Sellars’s critique of analysis about knowledge 
and Butler’s critique of definitions of ‘woman’ bear on one another predominantly consists in 
how both thinkers espouse conceptual frameworks that are democratically oriented. For both 
Butler and Sellars, in their respective ways, “[t]he ideal exercise of the rational capacities that 
any of us has now, from an epistemic as well as a political point of view …, seeks to cultivate 
and educate these same capacities in the direction of maximal inclusiveness”.81 
I think it is reasonable to claim that Sellars’s commitment to anti-foundationalism and 
expansive conceptual frameworks, typified by his notion of synoptic vision,82 is democratic 
and non-supremacist. His commitment to anti-foundationalism is democratic and non-
supremacist, because the activity of playing the game of giving and asking for reasons is 
sustained by mutual recognition. Sellars’s notion of synoptic vision, namely his attempt to fuse 
or combine the manifest image of the world83 with the ideal scientific image of the world,84 
aims to be democratic and non-supremacist, because there must be a pluralism of vocabularies 
in play to adequately make sense of things. To quote James O’Shea here, “the manifest image 
conception of persons as thinking and intending beings is supposed to be preserved rather than 
“overwhelmed” (SPR: 8-9)”85 when combined with the ideal scientific image of the world. 
Above all, Sellars’s commitment to anti-foundationalism and to the synoptic vision paints a 
picture of a thinker who wishes to replace, as Adriana Cavarero would phrase it,86 a rectitudinal 
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I should note that it not obvious that Kukla herself would attribute the aspiration of maximal inclusiveness to 
Sellars himself, even though she is starting from a Sellarsian account of perceptual knowledge, for, as I previously 
noted, the cost of putting Sellars into dialogue with Butler should not be fixing on one aspect of his views, the 
(left-wing) conceptual irreducibility of the logical space of reasons, at the expense of his (right-wing) strong 
scientific realism. 
82 The synoptic vision is “his attempt to bring his scientific naturalism fully to bear on his Kantian-pragmatist 
conception of the manifest image as the holistic and conceptually irreducible domain of persons and norms, of 
meaning and intentionality” (O’Shea 2016: ).   
83 The perspective of first-person intentionality and irreducible normative vocabulary. 
84 The ‘Peirceish’ perspective of natural science and purely descriptive and non-evaluative ways of sense-making. 
85 O’Shea 2007: 136. 
Cf. “Sellars’s effort to fuse the manifest and scientific images constitutes one of the richest and most penetrating 
attempts to make room for mathematically recalcitrant manifest properties within a scientific worldview” 
(  2016: ).  




and vertical image of sense-making practice and philosophical inquiry with a stereoscopic 
image of sense-making practice and philosophical inquiry:87 
 
The aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things in the broadest 
possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term … To 
achieve success in philosophy would be, to use a contemporary turn of phrase, to ‘know 
one’s way around’ with respect to all these things … in that reflective way which means 
that no intellectual holds are barred (SPR: 1) … The conceptual framework of persons is 
the framework in which we think of one another as sharing the community intentions 
which provide the ambience of principles and standards (above all, those which make 
meaningful discourse and rationality itself possible) within which we live our own 
individual lives. A person can almost be defined as a being that has intentions. Thus the 
conceptual framework of persons is not something that needs to be reconciled with the 
scientific image, but rather something to be joined to it. Thus, to complete the scientific 
image we need to enrich it not with more ways of saying what is the case, but with the 
language of community and individual intentions, so that by construing the actions we 
intend to do and the circumstances in which we intend to do them in scientific terms, we 
directly relate the world as conceived by scientific theory to our purposes, and make it 
our world and no longer an alien appendage to the world in which we do our living. We 
can, of course, as matters now stand, realize this direct incorporation of the scientific 
image into our way of life only in imagination. But to do so is, if only in imagination, to 
transcend the dualism of the manifest and scientific images of man-in-the-world. (SPR: 
40)  
 
Such a vision of what philosophy looks like and what its particular mode of cognitive 
engagement aspires to achieve seems to be shared by Nicholas Rescher:  
 
The definitive mission of philosophy is to provide a basis for understanding the world 
and our place within it as intelligent agents – with ‘the world’ understood 
comprehensively to encompass the realms of nature, culture, and artifice. The aim of the 
enterprise is to provide us with cognitive orientation for conducting our intellectual and 
practical affairs … Given this massive mandate, the prime flaw of philosophising is a 
narrowness of vision. Granted the issues are complex and specialisation becomes 
necessary. But its cultivation is never sufficient because the details must always be fitted 
into a comprehensive whole.88  
 
A philosopher who achieves her proximate, localised ends at the cost of off-loading 
difficulties onto other sectors of the wider domain is simply not doing an adequate job. 
With rationally cogent philosophising, it is not local minimalism but global optimalism 
that is required. To be acceptable, a philosophical problem-solution must form an integral 
part of a wider doctrine that makes acceptably good sense overall. Here only systemic, 
holistically attuned positions can yield truly satisfactory solutions – solutions that do not 
involve undue externalities for the larger scheme of things.89 
 
                                                 
87 See deVries (2016), O’Shea (2007, 2009), * (2019), and Levine (2019) for responses to whether Sellars’s notion 
of the synoptic vision is ultimately coherent and plausible. 
88 Rescher 2017: 32.  




Central to both Sellars’s and Rescher’s respective conceptions of the aims and task of 
philosophy is a commitment to holism. The kind of holism one can reasonably attribute to 
Sellars and Rescher is a Hegelian variety: in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel 
(in)famously claimed that “[t]he True is the whole. However, the whole is only the essence 
completing itself through its own development”.90 Here, the framework for understanding 
objects of experience is not restricted to the level of ordinary consciousness, where we can 
only make ‘thin’ judgements that express their atomistic separation and only an artificial kind 
of unity. This is why, for Hegel, a move from ordinary to philosophical consciousness consists 
in recognising, to use Paolo Diego Bubbio’s terminology, ‘mediate objectivity’ – “an ongoing 
process of mediation between subject and object which is always already in place”.91 
Rather than viewing reality as loosely connected sets of objects, we ought to conceive 
of Being as a complex and interconnected whole in which finite members are dialectically 
related. Such a move aims to supplant the perspective of Verstand with the perspective of 
Vernunft in discourse about sense-making. For Hegel, the advantage of drawing this distinction 
between reason and understanding is that we can be in a position to not be wrapped up in the 
various dualisms which are the inevitable consequence of reflecting only from the perspective 
of Verstand, i.e. purely analytical forms of reflection. What Vernunft provides consciousness 
with is the means to avoid the problems of analysis by thinking dialectically, i.e. by drawing 
distinctions yet establishing interconnectedness to a whole.  
Butler’s Foucauldian critique of feminist identity politics as well as her performativity 
thesis are clearly democratic and non-supremacist: 
 
Foucault points out that juridical systems of power produce the subjects they 
subsequently come to represent. Juridical notions of power appear to regulate political 
life in purely negative terms—that is, through the limitation, prohibition, regulation, 
control, and even “protection” of individuals related to that political structure through the 
contingent and retractable operation of choice. But the subjects regulated by such 
structures are, by virtue of being subjected to them, formed, defined, and reproduced in 
accordance with the requirements of those structures. If this analysis is right, then the 
juridical formation of language and politics that represents women as “the subject” of 
feminism is itself a discursive formation and effect of a given version of representational 
politics. And the feminist subject turns out to be discursively constituted by the very 
political system that is supposed to facilitate its emancipation.92 
 
For the purposes of a radical democratic transformation, we need to know that our 
fundamental categories can and must be expanded to become more inclusive and more 
responsive to the full range of cultural populations. This does not mean that a social 
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engineer plots at a distance how best to include everyone in his or her category. It means 
that the category itself must be subjected to a reworking from myriad directions, that it 
must emerge anew as a result of the cultural translations it undergoes. What moves me 
politically, and that for which I want to make room, is the moment in which a subject—
a person, a collective—asserts a right or entitlement to a livable life when no such prior 
authorization exists, when no clearly enabling convention is in place.93 
 
Crucially, if one’s metaphysics of gender is performative, then one is committed to the 
fallibilist view that the category of gender identity is never fixed, so much so that “[t]his field 
of possibilities is not static or singular but rather is a dynamic and contingent multiplicity”.94 
Above all, these theoretical gains have an important transformative and emancipatory 
advantage: they enable more democratic forms of association, “to produce new forms of 
intimacy, alliance, and communicability”.95   
To my mind, a particularly evocative example of a category itself needing to be 
subjected to a reworking from myriad directions, for the purposes of a radical democratic 
transformation, one bound up with Butler’s post-structuralism about gender, is Butler’s 
queering of kinship, namely “the radical project of articulating and supporting the proliferation 
of sexual practices outside of marriage [producing] variations on kinship that depart from 
normative, dyadic heterosexually based family forms secured through the marriage vow”.96 For 
Butler, the contention that marriage – whether heterosexual or homosexual – is what 
legitimates kinship and sexual relations between partners is “unacceptably conservative”.97 
States explicitly disincentivize non-marital relationships and arrangements, for non-marital 
kinship structures are not admitted into state-protection and state-incentive protocols despite 
having caring relationships. Therefore, the liberal claim to progressiveness, extending 
marriage to homosexuals, is not just premature, but a disturbing form of ideology. Coded 
ideology serves to create a pathological genus of doubt about the metaphysical legitimacy of 
one’s non-marital relationship. This particular variety of doubt is hermeneutically crippling 
and deeply distressing, preventing a healthy practical-relation-to-one’s-beloved. For, if your 
lover is not officially recognised, can you even mourn for them? If your lover is not officially 
recognised, can you even be said to have lost them if the relationship ends? As Butler writes:   
 
If you’re not real, it can be hard to sustain yourselves over time; the sense of 
delegitimation can make it harder to sustain a bond, a bond that is not real anyway, a bond 
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that does not “exist,” that never had a chance to exist, that was never meant to exist. Here 
is where the absence of state legitimation can emerge within the psyche as a pervasive, if 
not fatal, sense of self doubt. And if you’ve actually lost the lover who was never 
recognized to be your lover, then did you really lose that person? Is this a loss, and can it 
be publicly grieved? Surely this is something that has become a pervasive problem in the 
queer community, given the losses from AIDS, the loss of lives and loves that are always 
in struggle to be recognized as such.98 
 
 However, in response to my central comparative point concerning Butler and Sellars, 
namely the democratic and non-supremacist character of what they substitute for definitional 
analysis of key concepts, one may object in the following manner: there is a substantive 
difference between the sense in which Butler’s post-structuralism is aspiring to a radical 
democratic transformation, which concerns political subjects, and a democratic and non-
supremacist relation between Sellars’s two images. Under the Sellarsian synoptic vision of 
fusing the manifest and scientific images together into one coherent image, as O’Shea correctly 
notes, “Sellars does indeed want to hold that the ontology of persons as rational agents and 
conceptual thinkers within the space of reasons is in principle successfully accommodated 
within the comprehensively physicalist ontology of the ideal scientific image of the world”.99 
Since the Sellarsian synoptic vision is primarily structured by the comprehensively physicalist 
ontology of the (ideal) scientific image, the purely third-person naturalistic vocabulary will 
invariably have priority over the first-person intentional vocabulary of the manifest image. 
Under Sellars’s synoptic vision, so the argument goes, there is still some kind of epistemic 
hierarchy: non-eliminativist supremacy of the scientific image. 
 I think there is much to agree with in this objection, since there is a real risk of 
equivocation here. However, while I am happy to concede that, given the fundamental 
ambiguity of Sellars’s conceptual irreducibility of the manifest image-cum-strong scientific-
realism, his synoptic project is not radically transformative in exactly the same way that 
Butler’s project is radically transformative about kinship structures, I would contend that there 
is still an important sense in which Sellars can be legitimately regarded as radically 
transformative in the same formal way as Butler. Both thinkers are focused on myth-debunking: 
in Sellars’s case, overcoming the Myth of the Given; in Butler’s case, overcoming what one 
might call, the Myth of Immutability – where the ideological contention that marriage is the 
grounds of kinship shares the same formal fixed character as the Given’s foundationalism.  
                                                 
98 Ibid., pp. 25-26.  




The important parallel between Butler’s post-structuralist thesis about gender (as well 
as kinship structures) and Sellars’s normative pragmatism about knowledge enable one to think 
of her feminism as mapping out pragmatic cognitive strategies and visions for doing 
philosophy. What I mean by this is that her approach to gendered bodies and experiences 
employs conceptual resources providing a particularly rich and engaging way of doing 
philosophy, so much so that philosophy’s “self-image”100 can be improved, confirming Gary 
Gutting’s claim that “feminism promises to improve not only the climate for women but also 
philosophical thinking itself”:101 if one wishes to remain wedded to a view of philosophy as a 
second-order discipline concerned with critical reflection on the ways in which one makes 
sense of sense-making practices, then Butler’s post-structuralist anti-representationalist variety 
of feminist theorising makes a substantive metaphilosophical contribution, precisely because 
overturning the paradigm of definitional practice here is a prime instantiation of critical 
reflection on making sense of sense-making.  
So, as Bernard Williams would put it, what might philosophy become now? I think it is 
reasonable to claim that the professional self-image of philosophy in the Anglo-American 
analytic tradition is ‘naturalism’, the view that the image of the world provided by the natural 
sciences is all there is to the world.102 Naturalism, therefore, has metaphysical and 
methodological dimensions: (i) at the most fundamental ontological level, reality is just what 
the natural sciences deem it to be; (ii) our ways of intelligibly articulating reality, the ways in 
which we make sense of things, are ultimately justifiable only by the methods and practices of 
the Naturwissenschaften. The conjunction of (i) and (ii) is often referred to as ‘scientific 
naturalism’. In what follows, I propose to treat ‘naturalism’ and the philosophy-science relation 
in a way close to the anti-essentialist spirit ascribed to Sellars on epistemology and Butler on 
feminism. Crucially, though, having eschewed definitional treatments of ‘knowledge’ and 
‘woman’ in favor of pragmatic/democratic treatments, such a  metaphilosophical lesson cannot 
now insist upon a definitional treatment of ‘naturalism’, a particularly contested philosophical 
term. 
According to Williams, Jaegwon Kim, and Mario De Caro & David Macarthur 
respectively:    
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It is hard to deny that over too much of the subject, the idea of getting it right which has 
gone into the self-image of analytic philosophy, and which has supported some of its 
exclusions, is one drawn from the natural sciences; and that the effects of this can be 
unhappy.103 
 
If current analytic philosophy can be said to have a philosophical ideology, it is 
unquestionably, naturalism.104  
 
Naturalism is the current orthodoxy, at least within Anglo-American philosophy.105  
 
In terms of one’s philosophical coming-of-age in many analytic departments, one is baptised a 
naturalist, to remove the original sin of supernaturalism. And, in terms of one’s aspirations to 
be taken seriously in the Anglophone philosophical world and maintain good working 
relationships with the relevant powers-that-be, naturalism must be a doctrine which demands 
absolute loyalty on pain of some intellectual auto da fé. To quote Hilary Putnam: 
 
[t]oday the most common use of the term “naturalism” might be described as follows:  
philosophers – perhaps even a majority of all the philosophers writing about issues in 
metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind and philosophy of language – announce 
in one or another conspicuous place in their essays and books that they are “naturalists” 
or that the view or account being defended is a “naturalist” one; this announcement, in its 
placing and emphasis, resembles the placing of the announcement in articles written in 
Stalin’s Soviet Union that a view was in agreement with Comrade Stalin’s; as in the case 
of the latter announcement, it is supposed to be clear that any view which is not 
“naturalist” (not in agreement with Comrade Stalin’s) is anathema, and could not  
possibly be correct.106     
  
Over many years, however, the naturalistic self-image of Anglo-American analytic 
philosophy has come under scrutiny by analytically-trained thinkers, such as Richard 
Bernstein, Brandom, Stanley Cavell, Donald Davidson, Susan Haack, John Haugeland, 
Alasdair MacIntyre, Joseph Margolis, John McDowell, Adrian Moore, Stephen Mulhall, 
Thomas Nagel, Putnam, Rescher, Rorty, Sellars, Charles Taylor, and Williams,107 who are – in 
varying respects and with varying levels of intensity – internal critics of the Anglo-American 
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analytic tradition.108 Crucially, though, these ‘post-analytic’109 thinkers are not clustered 
together because each of them contributes to a fully defined and articulated philosophical 
tradition. Rather, Bernstein et al.110 are clustered in terms of how they all broadly share a 
                                                 
108 There is some similarity but also some difference between my cluster and the original cluster comprising the 
first collection of writings on post-analytic philosophy by Rajchman and West (1985), which regards Rorty as the 
paradigmatic post-analytic philosopher. As far as I am aware, the only other volume on post-analytic philosophy 
is Reynolds, Chase, Williams and Mares (2010). 
 
See the following from Williams: “it is particularly important that “post-analytic” should not be understood in 
terms of the supposed distinction between analytic and continental philosophy. I say this as one who is, both 
deniably and undeniably, an analytic philosopher: deniably, because I am disposed to deny it, and undeniably, 
because I suspect that few who have anything to say on the subject will accept that denial. What I do want to deny 
is the helpfulness of the distinction itself, and I shall mark that in particular by saying very little about it. But it is 
worth emphasising that what is unhelpful in this contrast goes beyond the matter of the unfortunate labels it uses”. 
(Williams 2006: 201)  
109 The following from George Duke, Elena Walsh, James Chase and Jack Reynolds is helpful here: “The term 
‘postanalytic’ has been used to characterize the work of thinkers who, having started out in the mainstream 
analytic tradition, came to place in question some of its central presuppositions” (Duke et al. 2010: 7). 
 
Construed in such a manner, one may now wonder where Quine fits into the cluster here, for Quine played 
arguably the most important role in moving analytic philosophy out of its Carnapian phase with his critique of the 
analytic/synthetic distinction, his critique of semantic reductionism, and his articulation of ontological relativity 
and the indeterminacy of translation. More to the point, Quine self-described as post-analytic. However, for all of 
Quine’s radical dismantling of the two dogmas of empiricism and break from Carnap and analyticity, Quine’s 
strict and conservative variety of naturalism and conception of philosophy as the abstract arm of empirical science 
means that he is a different kind of post-analytic philosopher to Bernstein et al.    
 
Another sketch of post-analytic philosophy is provided by Christopher Norris, who writes: “What chiefly unites 
[various ideas and movements of thought under the broad rubric of ‘post-analytic’ philosophy] – on the negative 
side – is a growing dissatisfaction with the analytic enterprise as it developed in the wake of logical empiricism. 
That project is now taken to have failed in all its main objectives, among them more recently the attempt to develop 
a truth-theoretic compositional semantics for natural language and a theory of beliefs (or propositional attitudes) 
that would explain how speakers and interpreters display such remarkable – though everyday – powers of 
communicative grasp. These ideas have come under attack from many quarters during the past two decades. Most 
influential here has been Quine’s assault on the two ‘last dogmas’ of empiricism and – supposedly following from 
that – his case for ontological relativity and meaning-holism as the only way forward in default of any method for 
individuating objects or items of belief. The result, very often, is an attitude of deep-laid skepticism with regard 
to the truth-claims of science and the idea that philosophy might offer grounds – reasoned or explanatory grounds 
– for our understanding of language and the world.” (Norris 1997: x) “What these approaches share is a sense that 
philosophy has now arrived at a stage – with its holistic turn against any version of the logical-empiricist paradigm 
– where talk of ‘truth’ (as hitherto conceived) becomes pretty much redundant. That is to say, it either drops out 
altogether (as in Rorty’s neopragmatist appeal to what is ‘good in the way of belief’), or else figures merely as a 
product of formal definition.” (Ibid., p. 2) “Such is at least one sense of the term ‘post-analytic philosophy’: the 
quest for an alternative to that entire tradition of thought, starting out from logical empiricism, whose upshot – 
after so much critical labor – would seem to be either a formalized (semantic or metalinguistic) theory of truth 
devoid of explanatory content, or on the other hand a pragmatist conception that reduces truth to the currency of 
in-place consensus belief.” (Ibid., p. 6) 
 
While some of what Norris writes about post-analytic philosophy is helpful, my concern is that (a) Norris 
misconstrues Quine’s critique of logical empiricism as undermining the epistemic authority of the natural 
sciences; and (b) Norris’s reliance on Rorty’s pragmatist-cum-deconstructionist critique of analytic philosophy as 
the exemplar of the post-analytic risks post-analytic philosophers such as Williams and Haack being seen as 
postmodernist thinkers.    
110 One might counter my point here by claiming that it is disingenuousness on my part to deem liberal naturalists 
as outside the mainstream of the analytic tradition, since there is already a sharp conflict underway to claim that 




critical stance towards the naturalistic self-image, where the more critical a thinker is of the 
naturalist orthodoxy, the closer such a thinker is to being branded ‘apostate’.111 Post-analytic 
philosophy’s self-image is no longer a conception of philosophy as handmaiden to the 
Naturwissenschaften, but rather a conception of philosophy as an amphibious humanistic 
discipline, at home with both the natural sciences and cultural theory. To quote Williams here, 
who provides a mantra of post-analytic philosophy’s metaphilosophical outlook: 
 
I very much prefer that we should retain the category of philosophy and situate ourselves 
within it, rather than pretend that an enquiry which addresses these issues with a richer 
and more imaginative range of resources represents “the end of philosophy.” The 
traditions of philosophy demand that we reflect on the presuppositions of what we think 
and feel. The claim which I am making, from here, from inside the subject, is that in 
certain areas, at least, this demand itself cannot be adequately met unless we go beyond 
the conceptions of getting it right that are too closely associated with the inexpressive 
models drawn, perhaps unconsciously, from the sciences … We can dream of a 
philosophy that would be thoroughly truthful and honestly helpful … It would need 
resources of expressive imagination to do almost any of the things it needed to do …112 
Philosophy is, rather, in these fields, the extension of our most serious concerns by other 
means, but at least it should introduce our ordinary concerns in a humanly recognizable 
form …113 But we should remember that work may be unimaginative not because it is 
badly argued but because it is arguing with the wrong people; not because it has missed 
an argument, but because it misses the historical and psychological point …114 
 
While, of course, Butler is not a post-analytic philosopher – and therefore unlikely to 
identify with the very specific ways in which Williams places philosophy – I think it would be 
incorrect to suppose this stultifies the potential for instituting some communicative space 
between Butler and post-analytic philosophers like Sellars. Butler’s anti-representationalist 
post-structuralist variety of feminist theorising, and Sellars’s anti-representationalist normative 
pragmatism about knowledge are prime instantiations of critical reflection on making sense of 
sense-making. The anti-essentialist spirit ascribed to Sellars on epistemology and Butler on 
feminism means that it would be incorrect to deem Williams’s position as ‘anti-naturalist’, as 
he is critical of scientistic varieties of naturalism only.115 As he said in a 2002 interview, “… 
in philosophy the thing that irritates me is smugness, particularly scientistic smugness. What 
makes me really angry these days are certain kinds of reductive scientism that knock all the 
                                                 
111 The way I have characterized post-analytic philosophy in the broad sense differs from how Hans-Johann Glock 
articulates the concept: “… continental philosophy presented by Anglophone commentators who refer to analytic 
thinkers like Wittgenstein, Quine and Davidson (e.g. Taylor, Cavell and Mulhall)” (Glock 2008: 256).  
112 Williams 2006: 211-12.  
113 Ibid., p. 206.    
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philosophical difficulties out”.116 Williams, therefore, aims to occupy a middle-ground position 
between, what McDowell calls, ‘bald naturalism’ (reductionism or eliminativism) and 
‘rampant Platonism’ (anti-naturalism):    
 
It can easily seem that there is no space to move here. Setting our faces against bald 
naturalism, we are committed to holding that the idea of knowing one’s way about in the 
space of reasons, the idea of responsiveness to rational relationships, cannot be 
reconstructed out of materials that are naturalistic in the sense that we are trying to 
supersede. This can easily seem to commit us to a rampant platonism. It can seem that 
we must be picturing the space of reasons as an autonomous structure – autonomous in 
that it is constituted independently of anything specifically human, since what is 
specifically human is surely natural … and we are refusing to naturalise the requirements 
of reason … But there is a way out. We get this threat of supernaturalism if we interpret 
the claim that space of reasons is sui generis as a refusal to naturalise the requirements of 
reason. But what became available at the time of the modern scientific revolution is a 
clear-cut understanding of the realm of law, and we can refuse to equate that with a new 
clarity about nature. This makes room for us to insist that spontaneity is sui generis, in 
comparison with the realm of law, without falling into the supernaturalism of rampant 
platonism.117     
 
For Williams et al. recognising the autonomy and heterogeneity of the normative space of 
reasons in no way entails conceiving of its features as “imaginary skyhooks”.118 Reality is, as 
Lynne Baker beautifully phrased it, “capacious … – more English garden than desert 
landscape”.119 In this respect, anti-essentialism can analogously help democratically treat 
‘naturalism’. I would argue that the ‘scientism wars’ are frustrating, principally because on one 
side, there are hermeneutic humanists who think that naturalists tout court are denying 
discourse-pluralism; and on the other, there are scientistic naturalists who think hermeneutic 
humanists are denying that, in the dimension of describing and explaining the world, science 
is the measure of all things. Because the Unity of Science thesis, whether reductionist or 
eliminativist, is not grounded in a careful examination of scientific practice, it risks opening 
the door to the charge of scientism. However, if one considers those philosophers of science 
who are looking at science in terms of practices, such as John Dupré, Nancy Cartwright, Steven 
Horst, and Joseph Rouse, a careful explication of how scientific practices yield a pragmatically 
efficacious grip on reality, there is reason to reject any top-down commitments to the Unity of 
Science (as for example driven by some a priori commitment to mechanistic physics as the 
epistemic ideal of inquiry). But, once one sees that pragmatic realism in philosophy of science 
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does not entail – and in fact, strictly speaking, undermines – the Unity of Science thesis, 
‘scientism’ just becomes a chimera. 
 
What I hope to have achieved in this paper is to start a conversation between two 
philosophers, ‘to produce new forms of intimacy, alliance, and communicability’.120 The anti-
essentialist spirit I have ascribed to Sellars on epistemology and Butler on feminism reveals a 
plethora of additional interesting and difficult questions about how the space of reasons is 
organized, where its epistemic authority comes from, how one negotiates the space of reasons, 
and especially, how one gets into normative space at all. The task of further papers is to “keep 
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